FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON HABEO+INFINITIVE AS AN EXPONENT OF FUTURITY

In his interesting paper on *habeo* and *aueo* published in *CQ* 66 (1972), 388–98, Dr. A.S. Gratwick raised a number of questions bearing on my own discussion of the origin and development of the *habeo*+infinitive construction in *CQ* 65 (1971), 215–31.

First the collapse of the earlier future-tense system. As I said, this was 'the product of a number of different linguistic events', phonetic, grammatical, and semantic, which were summarized and illustrated on pp. 220–1 of my paper. Even so Dr. Gratwick (p. 397) believes that I assigned too much weight to 'phonetic attrition of the future simple'. In particular he claims that the convergence of /w/ and /b/, which was one—but not the only one—of the phonetic events that I had mentioned,[1] was relatively unimportant since it affected only 1st pers. plur. forms of verbs which had perfects in *-āu̯-* and *-ēu̯-*: *laudare, delere* but not *secare, monere.* 'All other persons of the perfect will have had distinct forms by the loss of intervocalic *u̯* at a much earlier stage: *laudai, laudasti, laudát* (*laudáut, laudáit*), *laudastis, laudarunt*' (p. 397, n. 1).

These forms together with *laudamus* constitute the paradigm that is usually reconstructed for the preterite of the first conjugation of weak verbs in proto-Romance. *laudasti, laudastis, laudarunt* were already well established types in Classical Latin. They are the only shortened forms mentioned by Priscian in his discussion of 'syncope' in the perfect (*G.L.* 2. 508), even though he recognizes other instances elsewhere, notably *fumât, cupît* at *G.L.* 2. 130. 1 ff. The 1st sg. forms *probai, calcai* are censured by Probus at *G.L.* 4. 160. 14 ff.[2] The 1st plur. *-āmus* after its remarkable début in Propertius 2. 15 reappears infrequently in Merovingian Latin, e.g. *caelebramus* (Greg. Tur. *H.F.* 5. 17) and *speramus* (Fredeg. 1. 32). The risk of homophony with the corresponding present form was no doubt an inhibiting factor. But, as Dr. Gratwick himself observes on *habemus, auemus* (p. 394), ambiguities are often resolved by contexts. English *burst, cut, spread* etc. show homophony of present and preterite in all but the 3rd sg. Moreover the proto-Romance homophony of 1st plur. pres. and pret. is reflected in Spanish and Portuguese *cantamos, vivimos,* etc. right through to modern times.

Of the 3rd sg. forms *-āt* is attested as early as Lucr. 1. 70, *inritā̆t,* and perhaps Vg. *A.* 7. 363, *penetrā̆t* (thus distinguished from the presents *inrítat, pénetrat*; cf. Prisc. loc. cit.) and at least once epigraphically: *pugnat* on *CIL* 10. 7297 from Sicily. *-ait* and *-aut* have only epigraphic examples: *laborait* from Lucania, *dedicait* from North Africa, *donaut* from Rome, *pedicaud* from Pompeii, *edukaut* from Cisalpina, *curaut* from Dalmatia.[3] Although the three forms are recorded from

[1] For the convergence of /e·/ and /i/, which produced homophony between *dicēs* and *dicīs* and, in most parts of the Western Empire, *dicétis* and *dicĭtis* (< *dícitis*), see now R. Coleman, 'The monophthongization of /ae/ and the Vulgar Latin vowel system', *TPS* 1971, esp. pp. 175–80.

[2] Together with *probaisti, probaimus,* and *probaistis*, which though (unlike *probai*) they are not even indirectly attested in Romance, are plausible enough analogical formations from e.g. *audiisti, audiimus* etc. and need not be taken as merely hypothetical.

[3] Respectively *CIL* 10. 216, 8. 5667, 6. 6870, 4. 2048, 11. 1074, 3. 12700.

different regions, they could very well have been in free allomorphic variation within the same dialects.[4] For they do not represent successive stages in a process of phonetic change. *-āit* (> *ai̯t*) is analogical with *-*īit*, derived from *-īuit* by the loss of /w/ between like vowels, which is itself a regular pre-classical phonetic change; *-āt* is by analogy partly with *-īt*, which like *-iit* is derived from *-*īit*, partly with the already established *-āsti, -ārunt.*[5] By contrast, *-aut* is derived phonetically from *-āuit* by syncope in the final syllable.[6]

Even if they had been related as successive stages within a single phonetic diachrony, the three forms could still have coexisted within the same synchronic structure, as free allomorphic variants. For the effects of analogy within this area of the Latin verb morphology were very far-ranging. Thus *audīui*>*audĭi*, whence analogical *audĭeram*, beside *audīueram* which was not subject to the phonetic change. The latter in turn would favour the restoration of *audīui*. Again *delēuĕrunt*[7] > *delḗrunt,* whence analogical *laudārunt* and, with the additional pressure of *audīsti*, a new *delēsti* beside the older *delēuisti.* The continued existence of the latter would in turn favour the restoration of *delḗuerunt.* Which brings us back to Dr. Gratwick's paradigm.

It is clear that alongside the new shortened forms the older forms with *-u̯-* must have survived for a long time, even though they were eventually ousted. We have the evidence of literary verse-texts and inscriptions of the Empire, in which the *-u̯-* forms remain predominant; it would need an excessive scepticism to interpret all these as orthographic archaisms. There is also the evidence of occasional full forms showing *b* for *u̯* to prove that they were still employed even in Vulgar Latin: *conparabit* at Rome, *collocabi* in Dalmatia, *isperabi* at Puteoli, all from areas where *-aut* is also recorded.[8] Although the number of examples is itself too small to be significant, it is probable that the *-u̯-* variants survived longest in the *ā-* conjugation, where in contrast to *ī-* and *ē-* stem forms they were not subject to phonetic change but merely to analogic pressures.

There can be no doubt then that both *laudauimus* and *laudauit* survived as variants in the spoken language long enough to clash with *laudabimus, laudabit.* Most of the relevant examples of orthographic confusion show *b* for *u* rather than the reverse; which is not surprising, given that the change from labio-velar glide to bilabial fricative was a shift in a consonantal not vocalic direction.[9] The future forms were more damaged by the clash since the perfect system as a whole

[4] Romance philologists tend to operate with a single base-form, usually *-aut* (e.g. E. Bourciez, *Éléments de linguistique romane,* Paris 1946[4], §91a, W. Meyer-Lübke, *Grammaire des langues romanes,* Paris 1890–1906, 2 §266). But just as It. *cantó* < *cantaut,* so it seems preferable to derive O.Fr. *chantat* from *cantát*, O. Sard. *cantait* from *cantait* directly rather than by analogical pressures within the paradigms of the independent languages.

[5] It was similar analogical patterns that produced respectively *-ai* and *-amus.*

[6] Before [w] > [β], since probably [ãβit > *[ãβt] > *[aft] rather than [a: wt]. The dissyllabic form [a:ut] may have been the model for *-iut*, attested on *CIL* 6. 36377, *petiut* (cf. O. It. *-io*), and on 2. 6302, *posiut* (cf. Sp: *-ió*), if these are not also syncopated from 'restored' forms in *-īuit.*

[7] It is the older form *-ĕrunt*, rather than the more recent *-ḗrunt,* due to the influence of *-ḗre*, that is probably the starting point in all this. For the frequency of *-ĕrunt* in literary texts see D.W. Pye, *TPS* 1963, 1–27.

[8] Respectively *CIL* 6. 35381, 3. 9508, 10. 8189.

[9] There are a few examples of *u* for *b* in verb forms, e.g. on *CIL* 8. 19174 *infereuit* as the future of *inferre*; a reminder incidentally that in assessing the range of homophonic clash we should not have in mind only the classical paradigms. *b*-futures continued to find their way into *i-* stems from Plautus (*scibit, seruibit,* etc.) onwards; and *uestibit,* which occurs as a future in Ven. Fort. 9. 2. 124, is found as a perfect on *CIL* 31033.

had a much greater range of morphological formants.

Dr. Gratwick's image of a triangular semantic field marked 'prospect' with the three modal ideas 'can', 'must', and 'want' at its corners and 'pure prospect' at its centre, though somewhat fancifully expressed (p. 394), is a reasonable characterization of *habeo*+inf. in the later Empire. But it will not do at all for 'the situation . . . in the first century A.D. in vulgar speech'. Nor does he deal satisfactorily with the real problem: how the construction acquired this semantic field.

On the volitive meaning Dr. Gratwick introduces a new factor into the discussion, the history of *aueo*+inf. He sees the decline of this construction as the direct result of homophonic clash in the *sermo familiaris* with *habeo*+inf., which thereupon absorbed its volitive function. In the course of the argument he demonstrated that the infinitive with *aueo* tends in its earliest occurrences to be restricted lexically to verbs of learning, as that with *habeo* is to verbs of informing. In fact he claims more than a tendency (p. 393), but only by excluding instances with a non-personal subject like (i) Cicero's *auet animus . . . dicere* (p. 391, n. 4), and, with far less justification, participial transformations of *auet*+inf. with personal subject like (ii) Cicero's *auens . . . ornare* (ibid., n. 3).[10] In none of the examples of these two types is there any lexical constraint on the choice of infinitive. Dr. Gratwick records as 'not surprising' clear exceptions like (iii) *conuenire aueo*, again from Cicero (p. 392, n. 2). If we admit only (ii) and (iii) to our count, the lexical constraint is operative in 21 out of 29 of the examples cited from Lucretius, Cicero, and Varro. So tendency it clearly is. An explanation for it is hard to find; but lexical constraints of this sort usually indicate that the construction in question is either a technical phrase, a neologism, or an archaism.

The contextual range of occurrence of *aueo*+inf. does not suggest a technical usage—of law, rhetoric, or philosophy, for instance. The verb itself is ancient, belonging to the same formative class as *habeo, maneo, taceo.* It is cited by Varro from Ennius, though the infinitival construction is not recorded before Catullus and Cicero. After Cicero, who uses it in a wide variety of contexts, the construction and indeed the verb itself rapidly decline in frequency: which is not typical of neologisms. We may fairly conclude that it was in fact an old construction, which was already in decline when it had what was apparently a brief vogue in the literary register of late republican Latinity. Whether it belonged to the *sermo familiaris* in Cicero's day may be doubted. Cicero himself uses it in the refined conversation of his philosophical dialogues, but that is not quite the same thing; and the contrast between its relative frequency in the *Epistulae ad Atticum* and its absence from the *Ad familiares* may be more significant than Dr. Gratwick (p. 392, n. 1) allows.

The Horatian examples are not conclusive on this point. *parto quod auebas* occurs at *S.* 1. 1. 94 in a context of Lucretian moralizing, where the etymological connection of the verb with *auaritia*, the theme of the passage, is also apposite. The tone, though prosaic, is old-fashioned rather than colloquial. At *S.* 2. 6. 99, 'urbis auentes moenia . . . subrepere' is clearly mock-heroic: the great adventure of the country mouse with his friend. The archaic flavour of 'ara . . . auet immolato spargier agno' at *C.* 4. 11. 8 is patent, whatever its relation may be to some of the colloquial tone elsewhere in the poem. Only 'e quibus unus auet

[10] The true reason for excluding this group is revealed on p. 392 n. 3: '*habens*+inf. which would be parallel to *auens*+inf., does not appear before Tertullian.'

quauis adspergere cunctos' at *S.* 1. 4. 87 is colloquial in both tone and context, and here most modern editors follow Bentley in preferring *amet.* Livy[11] has two examples, at 33. 32. 8 and 45. 39. 8, both somewhat remote from *sermo familiaris.* Thereafter *aueo* itself is infrequent and the infinitival construction, as Dr. Gratwick noted (p. 391[12] with p. 392, n. 6), becomes a feature of the high poetic style: Lucan, Valerius, Silius, Statius, and *proximus poetis* Tacitus. This does not suggest associations with the *sermo familiaris* and is certainly not paralleled by the history of the infinitival construction with *habeo*. Dr. Gratwick attempts to circumvent the difficulty here by postulating a chronological gap: 'the verb *aueo* disappeared from living speech . . . about the time of Christ. Then it disappears entirely from literature. It turns up again in Lucan'. But the last extant examples of *aueo* before Lucan are from Livy and Ovid, who died less than a quarter of a century before he was born: the 'disappearance' is so brief as to be negligible.

Now even if *aueo* had, as I have argued, no particular associations with the *sermo familiaris*, it must have been pronounced somehow by those who wrote and read the texts that contain it. So the possibility of homophonic clash with *habeo* remains to be reckoned with. The crucial question is one of dating. The graphological evidence from Pompeii, mostly from the early and mid first century A.D., shows that /h/ was often omitted or wrongly inserted in initial position as it had been by Catullus' Arrius, but the confusion of /w/ and /b/ was relatively rare and mostly recorded in proper names.[13] It is possible that *aueo* and *habeo* were both pronounced [aβeo̯] in some idiolects of the Ciceronian period, but there is no evidence to prove it, and to talk of a 'modern habit' of pronouncing them as homophones in the Augustan age is a wild exaggeration. In any event an Augustan father sufficiently educated to be reading Lucretius to his son is unlikely to have confused the two, at 4. 778, 6. 711, or anywhere else. On the other hand by the time that the pronunciation of *habeo* as [aβeo̯] had become widespread in illiterate speech, perhaps as early as Statius, the evidence suggests that *aueo* was no longer in use except as a literary archaism and so could not have been a victim of this or any other homophonic clash.

Nor can it be taken for granted that the survivor of a pair of homophones automatically takes over the semantic fields of both. The semantic distinction may be maintained by the use of other exponents, as in the case of English *let* 'hinder' (v. 'allow') or by the development of new ones, as in the reflexes of Latin *gallus* (v. *gattus*) in south-west France.[14] Hence even if *aueo* had disappeared from living speech 'about the time of Christ' as a result of homophonic clash with *habeo*, it would still be necessary to demonstrate that the latter became established from that date 'as an exponent of desire as well as of potentiality' (p. 394). Where are the examples?

Dr. Gratwick cites three (p. 395)—all from late Latin. In the context (*Vit. patr.* 3. 7) of Abbot Zeno's remark 'nihil enim grande est quod habeo tollere', 'I wish to take' certainly makes better sense than 'I can take' or 'I am on the point of

[11] Who with Varro and Ovid must be excepted from Dr. Gratwick's rule (p. 393) that if 'a Classical or Augustan author' uses *aueo* with *audire* etc., he also uses *habeo* with *dicere* etc. In fact the only three to whom the rule positively applies are Lucretius, Cicero, and Horace.

[12] His arguments here and p. 390, n. 5 for reading *auet* at Arg. 1. 672, *aueo* at *Theb.* 6. 160 and *aues* in Gell. *N.A.* 20. 10. 2 are very convincing.

[13] See the lists in V. Väänänen, *Le Latin vulgaire des inscriptions pompéiennes* (Berlin 1966), 57–8, 50–2.

[14] For both examples see L. Bloomfield, *Language* (London 1935²), 396–9).

taking'. But the passage is usually dated to the sixth century! At *Itin. Ant. Plac.* 8, 'ea sane ratione ut quod habes emere non tangas antequam des', there is less to choose between 'you wish to buy' and 'you are going to buy'. It is somewhat misleading to say that 'the author of the somewhat more "correct" rec. B took the modality to be exclusively volitional (*uis* for *habis*)'. A glance at B's readings[15] is enough to throw doubt on its correctness, if indeed the word has much relevance to the variants in this text. Moreover it is very doubtful whether B's model had *habes* or *habis*. G has *et sane racione ut quod habis emere non tangas*; Br has *attamen ut quod ab illis emere uis non tangas*; B has *at cauent quod ab illis . . .* Now *uis* could have come from a corruption of *habes* > *habis* > *auis*, but the word order suggests that *abis* (< *habis*) has been replaced by *ab illis* in the original of Br and B and a new verb supplied. What their testimony shows is that a volitive modality suits the context once *habes* has disappeared, not that it was necessarily regarded as a semantic equivalent of this verb. Once again the passage dates from the sixth century, which is late enough to allow the additional possibility that *uis* may even be an exponent of plain futurity! Tert. *Resurr.* 52, though much earlier, is also somewhat inconclusive. At first sight a volitive sense in *ergo saluum est cui* dare habet *deus corpus* seems to follow naturally from the Pauline text that Tertullian is expounding: 'Deus autem dat illi corpus prout uult'. But the argument as it develops in the rest of the passage is concerned not so much with God's choice or acts of will as with the necessary connection between the safety of the seed that is dead and buried at one moment in time and its rebirth in a new god-given body at some time in the future. So an equally appropriate meaning would be 'therefore the seed to which God is bound to give a body is safe (from decay)', which would take us back to the necessity–futurity semantic complex again.

This leaves Past. Herm. *Sim.* 9. 9, which as I said previously (p. 219, n. 2) is 'one of the very few plausible examples' of volitive *habere*. In view of Dr. Gratwick's strange reluctance to accept it, the full texts had better be cited.[16] First the Greek:

εἰ οὖν, φημί, κύριε, ἀνάγκη ἐστί, τί σεαυτὸν βασανίζεις καὶ οὐκ ἐκλέγῃ εἰς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν οὓς θέλεις καὶ ἁρμόζεις εἰς αὐτήν;

Then the two Latin versions:

> (*Vulg.*) et dixi 'si necesse est igitur, quid te tricas et non eligis si quos habes eligere et aptas in structuram illam?'
>
> (*Pal.*) et dixi ei, 'Domine si necesse est hoc fieri, quid non eligis si quos uis et in structura maximos et splendidos aptas?'

Dr. Gratwick objects that 'it is an assumption that the translator even intended to turn the Greek word in question with an exact Latin equivalent' (p. 395). But whose assumption is it? Certainly not mine. What I did assume was that the translators were doing their best to render the sense of the original.

Two difficulties do arise at this point. First what was the original from which

[15] More fully recorded in the edition of J. Gildemeister (Berlin 1889) than in that of P. Geyer, in *CSEL* xxxix (Vienna 1898).

[16] The Greek original from A. Hilgenfeld's edition (Leipzig 1881²), the *Vulgata* version from Hilgenfeld's edition (Leipzig 1873), the *Palatina* from the edition of O. von Gebhardt and A. Harnack, *Patrum apostolicorum opera* iii (Leipzig 1877).

the translators were working? Did it differ in either case from the Greek text as we have it? It is obvious that the later translator (probably fifth-century) either did not have *σεαυτὸν βασανίζεις* in his original or overlooked it or could not cope with it; also that either he or his original transposed into the last clause of this sentence what in our text appears as part of the next sentence: *ἐξελέξατο ἐξ αὐτῶν τοὺς μείζονας καὶ λαμπρούς* . . . Fortunately such considerations do not affect *οὐκ ἐκλέγῃ* . . . *οὓς θέλεις*, but they lead straight to the second difficulty: how good was the translation? 'It is irrelevant', declares Dr. Gratwick, 'to adduce the Greek, for whatever the translator intended, his Latin reader or auditor will interpret what is said in its Latin context, without reference to the Greek original; for him as for us, this example is irresolubly ambiguous between futurity, volition and potentiality'. To be sure, the Greek text is irrelevant to the Latin monoglot's reaction to the translation, but it is nevertheless an important clue to the translator's intentions. If the Latin is irresolubly ambiguous, then the translator has bungled. But the ambiguity here is in itself no more irresoluble than that of the examples from *Vitae patrum* and *Itinerarium Antonini* cited earlier. Moreover the existence of a Greek original provides interpretative aid to which there is nothing comparable for the latter texts.

In fact this is one of the clearest instances of volitive *habeo*. It is also, given the usually accepted dating of the *Vulgata* to the late second or early third century, one of the earliest. Even so it does not clearly predate the earliest instances of *habeo* as a future auxiliary in Tertullian. Until earlier examples can be uncovered, it is best to regard the volitive function as a by-product of the development towards the semantic complex of prospectivity represented by Tertullian's usage.

This leaves possibility and obligation—necessity as the earliest semantic fields of the construction. How are they connected with each other? There seem to be three possibilities. First that the two modalities originally belonged to separate syntactic analyses, as *hoc habeo+dicere* 'I have this for saying, to be said' might be regarded as tangential to obligation, *habeo+hoc dicere* 'I have in my possession the saying of this' tangential to possibility. (In English there is certainly a semantic distinction, though a different one, between *I have to say this, I have to go* which are strongly obligative, and *I have this to say*, where it is difficult to sort out the modality as between possibility and intention—volition.) The tendency to distinguish 'must' and 'can' by the placing of the infinitive respectively before or after *habeo* (see pp. 229—30 of my earlier paper) may be a residue of some such semantic—syntactic correlation, but I cannot pretend to be at all confident about the above analysis even as a purely theoretical one.

Alternatively we may try to derive one modality from the other. So Dr. Gratwick, who writes of 'the use of *habeo*+inf. for the independent subjunctive in question in contexts of ability and then its extension by analogy to contexts of deliberation, where there is no valid distinction between potentiality and obligation, and to contexts where an idea of obligation is made explicit' (p. 390). Now the Latin subjunctive, combining as it did the semantic fields of both the inherited subjunctive and optative moods, was peculiarly suited to express the complex of modalities found in deliberative questions. But it is not at all clear why *habeo*, because it shared one of these modalities with the subjunctive, should have acquired by analogy any of the others, any more than *possum* or *debeo* did.

Nor is much light shed on the assumed semantic shift by the very dubious distinction that Dr. Gratwick proposes between deliberative questions of degree, as

being 'purely potential', and those of kind, as being 'ambiguous between potentiality and obligation'. Of the three examples cited (p. 389) Ovid's 'quid enim dare maius habebant?' (*Met.* 9. 658), as he says, clearly exhibits potentiality; but in Cestius' 'quid habui facere? perducere illum ad patrem? non feci' (*ap.* Sen. *Contr.* 1. 1. 19) the modality is surely obligation, since the questions imply the retort 'perducere debuisti'. In Augustus' 'compos factus uotorum meorum . . . quid habeo aliud deos immortales precari quam ut . . .?' (Suet. 58. 2) the modality is ambiguous, with potentiality the more likely but obligation at least possible. But the important question is not so much what our interpretation is in each instance but what it is based upon; and surely the criteria are not the lexical components of the sentence, e.g. whether it has *maius* or *aliud*, but the context in which it is placed. In all three of the above examples *habere* still retains its normal meaning: 'What greater gift had they to offer?' 'What had I to do?' 'Having had all my vows fulfilled what have I to pray for?' The modality—in marked contrast to the deliberative subjunctive—is entirely the product of the meaning 'have' and the particular context.

My reasons for asserting that 'of the two modalities in question Obligation—Necessity was probably the more decisive antecedent to the new semantic developments' towards Futurity were clearly stated on pp. 219—20. *posse*+inf. is only rarely used in Late Latin as an exponent of futurity, and the usage is transitory; the reflexes of this verb in the Romance languages do not exhibit any trace of it. Nor is there any parallel known to me of a semantic shift from possibility to futurity.[17]

By contrast the adaptation of a verb signalling obligation—necessity as an exponent of futurity is attested by the use of *shall* in English and its cognates in Gothic and Middle High German. Dr. Gratwick's account of the English phenomenon is somewhat obscure: 'the *shall* of English has only come to be an atonic exponent of futurity because of the equal and opposite tension of the *will* . . . An exponent of obligation will need an exponent of desire to neutralize it'[18] (p. 396).

At the stage when *shall* and *will* were not yet established as future auxiliaries but still retained their original modalities, there would certainly have been some restriction on the occurrence of *will*. Thus (i) whereas there would be an obvious semantic correpondence between active *I shall conquer him* 'I am bound to . . . ' and passive *he shall be conquered by me*, the passive *he will be conquered by me* 'it is his will or intention to . . .' would clearly not correspond to *I will conquer him*. In any case *will* would be abnormal with the passive of many other verbs besides *conquer*. (ii) *I shall not be touched by anything* 'I am bound not to be . . .' would correspond to the active *nothing shall touch me*, but there would be no semantic correspondence between *I will not be touched by anything* 'it is my will or intention not to be . . .' and *nothing will touch me*. The latter would in any case be abnormal with inanimate subjects. In fact the emergence of phrases like *he will be conquered* and *nothing will touch me* is conclusive evidence of a semantic shift from volition to futurity. So already in the use of Old English

[17] The Greek optative shows an extension from potentiality to conditioned futurity only. As for Dr. Gratwick's assertion that 'atonic *can* [kn] is often so used in colloquial English' (p. 396, n. 1), it would be interesting to see the evidence for this.

[18] As a general proposition this is refuted by the evidence of Sardinian, where all the exponents of futurity derive from exponents of obligation (*depo kantare* < *debeo cantare*; *apa a kantare* < *habeat ad cantare*) and there is no trace of rival volitives.

willan: 'Darius geseah þæt he oferwunnen beon wolde' 'Darius saw that he would be conquered' (not 'that it was his will to be . . .') and 'æghwylc gecwæð þæt him heardra nan hrinan wolde' 'everyone said that nothing hard would touch him' (not 'wanted to . . .').[19]

On the other hand the very correspondence between active and passive uses of *shall* makes it much harder to detect the semantic shift to futurity; which is by no means irrelevant to our semantic charting of *habeo*. Thus it would be impossible to distinguish the uses of *sculan* in Caedmon's 'hwæt sceal ic singan' (Bede, *Hist.* 4. 24) and the Creator's 'ðu scealt deaðe sweltan' (Genesis 2: 17), were it not for the clues provided by the respective Latin texts: 'quid debeo cantare?' and 'morte morieris'. That *sculan* retains something of its obligative modality in the latter example is indicated by comparison with e.g. Genesis 2: 24, 'forlæt se man fæder 7 modor' 'relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem', where the emphatic threatening tone is absent, and so the normal Old English use of present for future is retained.

When *sculan* and *willan* emerged as future auxiliaries, there appears to have been no restriction as to person nor does *willan* show any trace of the original restriction as to voice which we postulated above. In Middle English *shal* is the commoner of the two rivals in this function, but *wil* gains steadily throughout the period and later. Symptomatic are Wyclif's 'y shal rise and go to my fadir' and the Authorized Version's 'I will arise and go to my father' at Luke 15: 18, the latter's 'ye shall find the babe' and the New English Bible's 'you will find a baby' at Luke 2: 12. In an effort to rationalize the coexistence of the rival exponents and stabilize the encroachment of the one on the other the familiar rules prescribing *shall* for first persons, *will* elsewhere in ordinary future tenses etc. appear to have grown up in the eighteenth century.[20] It looks as if these pedagogic rules rather than the facts of linguistic usage lie behind Dr. Gratwick's talk of 'tension' between *shall* and *will* and the 'neutralization' of exponents of obligation by those of desire. Certainly in modern English, where the modal functions of both *shall* and *will* (but not *be willing*) are virtually obsolete, *shall* has become almost completely ousted even as an exponent of futurity by *will* in emphatic statement and *'ll* (<*will*) in unemphatic. In short the history of *shall* and *will* merely shows that future meanings can be developed independently by exponents of obligation and desire, one of them being at one stage in the ascendant only to be eclipsed almost totally by the other at a later date. It does not affect the proposition that in the history of *habeo*+inf. the modality obligation—necessity was likely to have been the chief semantic antecedent to the use as a periphrastic future.

The point is implicitly conceded by Dr. Gratwick when he observes that 'a disproportionately large element of the material in and after Tertullian consists of assertions by Christians that an event was the fulfilment of part of the Divine dispensation, or will take place because it is foreordained in the Scriptures' (p. 397). The notion of a prophetically guaranteed-future tense would no doubt appeal to those who still believe that there was something distinctive about the grammatical idiom of Christian Latin. But what, we may fairly ask, is the relation between this usage and the use of *habeo*+inf. that is reflected in the non-guaran-

[19] It is hard to see why B. Mitchell, *A Guide to Old English* (Oxford 1965), §211, is so cautious about these two examples.

[20] For an ingenious attempt to enlist the obsolete modalities in support of the rules and in explanation of the numerous exceptions see H. Sweet, *A New English Grammar* ii (Oxford 1898), §§2196–202.

teed-future tenses of Romance? In refusing to recognize it 'as reflecting a development of popular speech, still less as initiating it' (p. 397) Dr. Gratwick is virtually excluding any possible relation. This passes all belief.

The contrast between the strongly emphatic future in 'ðu scealt sweltan' and the milder less assertive (present for) future in 'forlæt se man' certainly suggests that in the use of *habeo*+inf. also the shift was from obligation—necessity to a confidently asserted futurity in the first instance. It is possible but not very probable that the Latin shift began in the 'prophetic' contexts of the Christian apologists and spread from there with the faith itself, to become diluted eventually into an exponent of unemphatic futurity. Much more likely, the semantic shift belongs in its entirety to vulgar Latin, and the apologists took it from there. Popular speech is continually replacing existing words and phrases by livelier and more vigorous equivalents. So the shift in question is just what we should expect in Vulgar Latin: an emphatic exponent of futurity emerges alongside the older future forms. As these decline it gradually replaces them and in so doing loses its distinctive emphasis.

The *habeo* construction may well have had a more assertive character than the classical exponents of futurity in the period when Tertullian was writing and for some time afterwards. But in none of the apologists is its use systematic enough to have been motivated by nice theological distinctions between guaranteed and non-guaranteed futurity. In fact the Christians employ it side by side with classical exponents, e.g. Tertullian's 'quod esset uenturus et pati haberet' (*Adv. Iud.* 8) and Augustine's 'aliquando Christiani non erunt et idola rursus coli habent' (*Serm.* 40. 1), both cited by Dr. Gratwick himself, p. 397, n. 2. The free variation between the old and the new exponents must have obtained for a considerable length of time in Vulgar Latin itself. Infiltration of the literary registers by colloquial usage is a commonplace of linguistic history. In this instance a particular socio-cultural motive may also have been present: to employ now and again in preaching a Gospel meant for the masses the idiom of the masses in preference to that of the dying pagan culture. However, with rare and special exceptions like Jerome's Vulgate, the effort was not sustained. Thus Augustine shows a much lower incidence of *habeo*+inf. than Tertullian, and this at a time when the construction must have been very common indeed in Vulgar Latin. So wide was the gulf becoming between the written and spoken languages.

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